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the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding.'
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INTRODUCTION

When Hardy Cross Dillard retired in 1968 as Dean of the University of Virginia School of Law, the Virginia Law Review published
numerous tributes to his successful career as a scholar, professor,
government advisor, and dean.2 Hardy Dillard was then 66 years
old. Referring to his "extraordinary grace and felicity in style, ' ' 3 his
friends Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell noted that "the initiatives of Dean Dillard are more likely to mark the beginning than
the end of an era."' In assessing Dean Dillard's contribution to
legal education and jurisprudence, they observed with some degree
of foresight that "[t]he largest community in which Dean Dillard
would locate, and make inquiry about law, is.

.

.the community

of the whole of mankind.""
On February 6, 1970, Hardy Cross Dillard became a Member of
the International Court of Justice at The Hague, replacing Judge
Philip C. Jessup whose 6nine-year term had expired. As the
"principal judicial organ" of the United Nations, the Court is
intended to represent "the main forms of civilization and of the
principal legal systems of the world."' Particular judges are selected as individuals rather than as national representatives, and
the nominating process operates within the national groups of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration.8 Although these nominating
2. 54 VA. L. Rnv. 583 (1968); see McDougal & Lasswell, In Dedicationto Dean
Dillard:Man of Depth and Style, id. at 585. Under the rules at the University of
Virginia, all administrators retire at 65, but professors may continue to teach
until they reach 70. After retiring as Dean, Judge Dillard continued to serve as a
professor until he assumed his position on the International Court of Justice in
1970.
3. Id. at 586.
4. Id. at 594.
5. Id. at 590.
6. The International Court of Justice will hereinafter be referred to as "the
Court." This article will not focus upon the institutional details of the Court since
there are numerous references available covering this subject. See generally E.
DEUTSCH, AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW (1977); F. GRIEVES, SUPRANATIONALISM
AND INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 82-117 (1969); 1 & 2 SH. ROsENNE, THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT (1965); SH. ROsENNE, THE WORLD COURT:
WHAT IT Is AND How IT WORKS (1962) [hereinafter cited as THE WORLD COURT].
For a thorough assessment of the Court's activities, see 1 & 2 THE FUTURE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (L. Gross ed. 1976). See also Lillich & White,
The Deliberative Process of the International Court of Justice: A Preliminary
Critique and Some Possible Reforms, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 28 (1976).
7. I.C.J. STAT. art. 9.
8. For a more detailed treatment of this nominating process, see Gdlden,
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groups operate almost exclusively within a domestic context, a

candidate for membership on the Court must obtain an absolute
majority of votes in both the General Assembly and the Security
Council.' The professional qualifications of judges are set forth in
article 2 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. "The
Court shall be composed of a body of independent judges, elected
regardless of their nationality from among persons of high moral
character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are
jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law." 1 In
assuming his position on the Court, Judge Dillard thus fulfilled the
McDougal-Lasswell prediction.
The purpose of this article is to provide a critical assessment of
Judge Dillard's performance during his tenure on the International
Court of Justice. Much of this article will be "jurisprudential" in
scope, endeavoring to examine developments in international legal
theory and international organizations during the past two decades
and to assess recent decisions written by the Court. The approach
will in part be an institutional one, taking into consideration the
ability of an individual member of the Court to shape decisional
outcomes of an international body which must resolve contentious
litigation and render advisory opinions within the structure of a
small group decision-making process substantially different from
that of United States domestic courts. Yet, the thoroughness of
such an approach is necessarily limited by the peculiar characteristics of the Court as an internationaljudicial b.ody representing
the "principal legal systems of the world" and also functioning as
"the only principal organ of the United Nations which is composed
of individuals not directly representing States.' 12 The focus, then,
National Groups and the Nomination of Judges of the International Court of
Justice: A PreliminaryReport, 9 INT'L LAw. 333 (1975).
9. Id. at 333, 337.
10. I.C.J. STAT. art. 2.

11. The term "small group decision-making process" encompasses a number
of psychological, judgmental, historical, and developmental variables which relate to the way a party functions in a decision-making context. Such factors may
involve a judge's background, his sense of timing in intervening in a discussion,
his assumptions about a problem, his ability to understand key issues, his
"irascibility quotient," and his capacity to make emotional as well as intellectual
appeals. Assessment of these and other factors is intended to provide an evaluation of a judge's overall performance. I am indebted to Professor G. Edward White
of the University of Virginia School of Law for having suggested this mode of
analysis.
12. THE WORLD COURT, supra note 6, at 125.
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will be primarily personal-an attempt to evaluate Judge Dillard's
"official" opinions in light of the corpus of his jurisprudence written during his years as law professor and dean. The inquiry will
focus especially upon the relationship between theory and practice, between professor and practitioner, keeping in mind Judge
Dillard's observation that "a judge must find a solution for every
difficulty, whereas a professor must find a difficulty for every solution." 3
Such an approach obviously runs several risks. As Lasswell and
McDougal remarked in their Dedicationto Dean Dillard,
It would do violence to fact, and possibly to Dean Dillard's sensitivities to suggest that he has ever purported explicitly to project a
comprehensive theory about law. He has many time expressed wariness about pretentious and over-elaborate systems, and he would
probably regard any effort to impose a programatic framework upon
his expressed insights as an obnoxious form of intellectual hubris."
This "disclaimer" notwithstanding, Judge Dillard has contributed
substantially to modem international legal jurisprudence. To refrain from trying to identify consistent or disparate strains of analysis in his work would be tantamount to ignoring the presence of
systematic thought. The risk comes in having to draw conclusions
and advance generalizations about a living jurist's intellectual
habits and biases without making his jurisprudence seem rigid.
II.

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL JURISPRUDENCE

International law like domestic law must confront challenges to
the nature and scope of obligation. Law in general may be conceived of in a functional capacity, providing what Roscoe Pound
called the "every-day agency of social control."' 5 Law can only
serve that function by dealing with questions which "arise within
some system of law (municipal or international) and are settled by
reference to the 'rules or principles of that system."' 6 Thus, a given
legal system disposes of legal problems by reference to accepted
rules, sanctions, and orders which are commonly recognized as
binding upon the system's participants. The most obvious distinction between domestic and international legal systems is the rele13.

Dillard, The World Court-An Inside View, 1973 PROc. AM. Soc'Y hrr'L

L. 296, 297.
14. McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 2, at 587.
15. Pound, Philosophical Theory and International Law, in 1 BmUOTH.CA
VISSERIANA 71, 80 (1923).
16. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 211 (1961).
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vant factual background out of which particular rules, sanctions,
and orders emerge. According to H.L.A. Hart, "the factual background to international law is so different from that of municipal
law, [that] there is neither a similar necessity for sanctions (desirable though it may be that international law should be supported
by them) nor a similar prospect of their safe and efficacious use."' 7
This jurisprudential theory presupposes that the sociological, political, and economic facts of a given social order govern the extent
to which a legal organization will manifest primary rules of behavior, a basic rule of recognition, secondary rules of recognition, rules
of change, and rules of dispute adjudication. Having acknowledged
that between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries a "profound
change took place in the facts to which international law was to
be applied,"'" Pound characterized the relationship between the
facts of international law and philosophical theory as follows:
The facts of an international law that must govern peoples, not
personal sovereigns, that must deal with large indeterminate
groups, swayed in varying proportion by all the conflicting elements
that enter into public opinion for the time being, not with individual
men or with small, continuous cohesive groups of individuals, demand a theory that shall grow out of these facts and interpret them
for us in terms of effective effort toward perceived ends, as the lawof-nature theory grew out of and interpreted the facts creatively and
toward ends which it pictured.'
International law thus resembles a regime of primary rules in
which, because of the fact that the process of achieving consensus
or acceptance among states is much slower than in the municipal
context, a fundamental rule of recognition is regarded as a
"luxury.

20

Once it is recognized that international law need not

contain a rule of recognition elaborating the basis of obligation
within a state's sytem, the objection that international law is not
law at all becomes invalid. The political facts involved dictate that
17.

Id. at 214.

18. Pound, supra note 15, at 78.
19. Id. at 75-76. As an example of the type of international law he envisions,
Pound refers to the system created by Hugo Grotius:
Much of the strength of Grotius' international law, which enabled it to

become a real body of living law so quickly, was in this: that it grew out of
and grew up with the political facts of the time and its fundamental conception was an accurate reflection of an existing political system which was
developing as the law was doing and at the same time.
Id. at 76.
20. H.L.A. HART,supra note 16, at 229.
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international law resembles less a system of law embracing both
rules of recognition and primary rules of conduct than an evolving
set of rules. Realization of this feature helps diminish the apparent
contradiction between the absolute sovereignty of nations and the
concept of a binding international obligation. The identification
and articulation of common values in the municipal setting proceeds in a much more certain and reliable fashion, with the resulting legal system reflecting silent salient shared values. Such identification and articulation is generally more contentious in the
international spectrum, and any resulting rules are apt to represent hard-won temporary compromises rather than time-tested
fundamental bases of agreement. 21 The search for the sources of
international law, then, becomes a quest for the definition and
delineation of the stage of development of that set of operative
rules at a particular point in time.
The jurisprudential approach outlined above resembles that of
the positivist school of thinking in which rules are generated on the
basis of observing state practices rather than beginning from a
teleological or norm-oriented perspective associated with natural
law. 22 In his 1963 Presidential Address to the American Society of
International Law entitled Conflict and Change: The Role of Law,
Judge Dillard described law as "a mediating device capable, when
properly understood and wisely applied, of reconciling the claims
of the old order under pressures from the new." He characterized
Pound as "plead[ing] for a conception of the legal order as a
21. One recent example of the difficulty in arriving at commonly shared perceptions about the validity of emergent norms in international law is the debate

over expropriation standards. See, e.g., Leigh & Sandler, Dunhill: Toward a
Reconsideration of Sabbatino, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 685, 697-709 (1976). But see
Rabinowitz, Viva Sabbatino, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 697, 716-24 (1977).
22.

L. KOLAKOWSKI, POSITIVIST PHmIosoPHY

FROM HUME TO THE VIENNA CIRCLE

(1972). Kolakowski defines positivism as

[a] certain philosophical attitude to human knowledge; strictly speaking,
it does not prejudge questions about how men arrive at knowledge-neither
the psychological nor historical foundations of knowledge. But it is a collection of rules and evaluative criteria referring to human knowledge: it tells
us what kind of contents in our statements about the world deserve the
name of knowledge and supplies us with norms that make it possible to
distinguish between that which may and that which may not reasonably be
asked. Thus positivism is a normative attitude, regulating how we are to
use such terms as "knowledge," "science," "cognition," and "information."
Id. at 10-11.
23. Dillard, Conflict and Change:The Role of Law, 1963 PRoc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L
L. 50, 50-51.
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process and not a mere condition" 4 to be accepted uncritically and
stated that
Pound expressed the view forty years ago that international law
shou'ld be realistic, creative and axiologically oriented; that it
should take account of social psychology, economics and sociology
as well as politics, and that it should furnish a functional critique
in terms of social ends rather than in terms of the norms of law
themselves."
Thus, Judge Dillard places some credence in the "policy oriented" approach concerning the role of law, which he sees as essential to accommodate changes in the international arena." Judge
Dillard recognizes that outside of the municipal context, the ability to agree upon rules which validate certain behavior among
states is more difficult to achieve. While adopting Hart's view that
fundamental rules relating to behavior must be "open-textured"
or flexible enough to be given content in actual practice, he observes that the source of international law is much broader, but
implies that the boundaries are not so elastic as to make their
identification impossible:
The question of the validating agency, the dictionary, must of
course be the world community; nor aoes this mean that "anything
goes" if you can get by with it. Quite to the contrary, it only means
that in the international sphere, as in less developed societies, the
role of the court and jury as a "dictionary" is displaced by more
protean and formless agencies.Y
From this perspective, even the nature of validation in international law occupies a different position than in the domestic context: "Law does not exhaust its function merely by settling disputes. It has an 'order-creating' or 'constitutive' function as well;
it performs this function by fashioning new patterns of relations."
I.

INFLUENCES ON JUDGE DILLARD'S JURISPRUDENCE

A.

American Legal Realism

Hardy Dillard "quit" international law at the end of the Second
24. Id. at 51.
25. Id.
26. For an example of the policy-oriented approach applied, see McDougal,
Lasswell & Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order: A Framework for
Policy-OrientedInquiry, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 237 (1969).

27. Dillard, supra note 23, at 55.
28. Id. at 62.
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World War in order to pursue his studies of jurisprudence.29 "I
became fascinated with jurisprudence, and that's what I taught
both [at Virginia] and at Columbia, but I kept a finger in the
international field because I also gave annually a seminar on law
and foreign policy.""0 At the time of his appointment to the Court,
Hardy Dillard considered himself more of a jurist than an international lawyer: "I became intrigued by the ferment that was going
on with the American Legal Realist movement. I read deeply into
Roscoe Pound, Morris Cohen ....
In my Hague Lectures I drew
on Pound quite a bit."'" This fascination with jurisprudence came
early in Judge Dillard's career when, as a student at the University
of Virginia, he accidentally discovered Roscoe Pound's essay,
Mechanical Jurisprudence,3 while browsing through the library.
His Hague Lectures,. written in 1957 and entitled "Some Aspects
of Law and Diplomacy,"' reflect Pound's influence and present an
analysis of social conflict in terms of law's concern "with the clash
of actual or potential interests." 3' The analysis went beyond simple
identification of rights and obligations and was "concerned with
the creation of a whole welter of relations and with so ordering
these relations as to minimize friction and promote order."' 5 The
main value of law in this complex ordering process lies not in its
predictability, its ability to yield certainty in the untangling of
what Judge Dillard refers to as "fusses," 3 but rather in its ability
to create order by revealing the issues, values, policy choices, and
likely impact involved in specified outcomes. Contrasting "law"
with "diplomacy," he suggests that the major weakness of the
former is that it is imposed on the parties, while diplomacy is not.
Law, however, eliminates the necessity of good faith, while diplo29. Interview with Judge Hardy Cross Dillard, in Charlottesville, Virginia
(Sept. 27, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Interview I]. The interviews cited in this
article were tape recorded, and are on file at the University of Virginia Law
Library. Judge Dillard's interview remarks which are included herein have been
slightly edited for purposes of preparing them for publication.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence,8 COL. L. REV. 605 (1908).
33. Dillard, Some Aspects of Law and Diplomacy, 91 RECUEEL DES COURs 449

(Neth. 1957).
34. Id. at 457.
35. Id. at 466.
36. Judge Dillard refers to this notion that law is primarily concerned with
imposing restraints on conduct as the "Fuss Fallacy." Book Review, 18 VA. J.
INT'L L. 181, 189-90 (1977). See also Dillard, supra note 33, at 498.
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macy's major weakness is its reliance on good faith.37
The tension arising from the law-diplomacy dichotomy may be
found in the need to reconcile the view that rigid, obligationcreating and, therefore, adjudicable standards are needed to manage all types of disputes, with the attitude that too much insistence
upon legal codification stifles flexibility and creative, negotiated
dispute settlement. "I tend to be somewhat conservative. I'm not
a conservative about law as a method for absorbing conflict. I am
conservative about third party judgment as necessarily being the
best way to settle [it]. I don't necessarily relate law and third
party judgment. ' 38 The drawbacks of imposed legal settlements,
especially in international disputes, stem from both the view that
the body imposing the solution may be too remotely related to the
factual, historical, or political context to appreciate important
subtleties and nuances39 and the inescapable fact that international legal standards are frequently perceived to be vague or lacking in authority. 0 From the standpoint of the International Court
of Justice, institutional confidence would appear to be a function
of its ability not only to resolve fundamental disagreements but
also to effectuate results which serve as "diplomatic" resolutions
of tough cases and as legitimizing decisions nurturing its own authority and credibility.4 1 Because application of legal standards'
alone will not solve all contentious cases, Judge Dillard recommends an interlocking of law and diplomacy whereby law serves
as an "ordering" device 2 which helps in dispute settlement and at
the same time leaves room for the parties themselves to play a
major role in the final determination."
The value of legal realism lies in its explicit rejection of mechanical jurisprudence and its positivist" espousal of the notion that
37. Dillard, supra note 33, at 514.
38. Interview with Judge Hardy Cross Dillard, in Charlottesville, Virginia
(March 25, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Interview II]. See also Dillard, supra note
33, at 523.
39. See Western Sahara Advisory Opinion [1975] I.C.J. 1, 116 (opinion of
Judge Dillard).
40. Dillard, supra note 33, at 515-16.
41. Id. at 520. An analogous decision in United States jurisprudence would
obviously be Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803), where the Court essentially staked out the limits of its own
authority by imposing limits on the scope of its own jurisdiction. See also Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
42. Dillard, supra note 33, at 533.
43. See Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, [1974] I.C.J. 3, 53 (opinion of Judge
Dillard).
44. L. KOLAKOWSKI, supra note 22, at 10-11.
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legal principles are not derivable solely from "a brooding omnipresence in the sky." 5 Positivism had its influence on international law as well, with "[p]ositivist international lawyers
[seeking] to find by observation laws of development of an ordering of international relations, to verify these laws of historical and
analytical investigation and to deduce their logical consequences
in the form of legal rules."46 Positivism and its subsequent adoption by the American legal realists led to a decline in the nineteenth century attitude of historical and metaphysical determinism and to a greater recognition of the "role which human initiative may play in the building of institutions and the shaping of
human events."4 When viewed as part of a fallible process of trial
and error, law and legal method become more scientific in nature,
not in the sense of "reveal[ing] infallible truths about the nature
of being but schematiz[ing] actual experience in a way that
makes possible its technical exploitation."48
B. The Policy-OrientedApproach to Law
In an article entitled The Policy-OrientedApproach to Law,4"
Judge Dillard reviewed the perspective on law most characteristically associated with the endeavors of Myres McDougal, Harold
Lasswell, and their various associates at the Yale Law School. This
approach "attempts to weld 'law,' 'science,' and 'policy' into a
45. The phrase comes from Justice Holmes' dissent in Southern Pac. Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 218, 222 (1917). See also Black & White Taxicab &Transfer
Co. v. Brown v. Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532 (1928) (Holmes,
J., dissenting); Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 370 (1910) (Holmes,
J., dissenting).
46. Pound, supra note 15, at 87.
47. Id. at 89. According to Pound this understanding was one of the consequences of World War I. The British philosopher Sir Karl Popper has also emphasized a similar understanding, namely, that we are responsible for our own destinies:
[P]roblems connected with the uncertainty of the human factor must force
the Utopianist, whether he likes it or not, to try to control the human factor
by institutional means, and to extend his programme so as to embrace not
only the transformation of society, according to plan, but also the transformation of man. "The political problem, therefore, is to organize human
impulses in such a way that they will direct their energy to the right strategic points, and steer the total process of development in the desired direction."
K. POPPER, THE POVERTY OF HISTORIcisM 69-70 (1961) (quoting K. MANNHEIM, MAN
AND SOCIETY 199 (1949)).
48. L. KOLAKOWSKI, supra note 22, at 33.
49. Dillard, The Policy-OrientedApproach to Law, 40 VA. Q. REV.626 (1964).
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comprehensive system reflecting not a casual symbiosis but a realistic method of inquiry and analysis." 5 The McDougal-Lasswell
approach begins by identifying and analyzing the process by which
authoritative decision-making is achieved, and a central feature
of this method is the requirement-completely antipathetical to
natural law theory-that the goal values of a system be made
wholly explicit from the outset. "[in simplest form the McDougal-Lasswell decision theory postulates that rational decision
requires the performance of five intellectual tasks: clarification of
goals, description of past trends, analysis of conditions affecting
past trends, projection of future trends, and invention and evaluation of policy alternatives."5 1 Judge Dillard is undoubtedly sympathetic to the policy-oriented approach to law, since he sees it as
both a continuation of Pound's theory of social interests and an
offshoot of pragmatism and the American legal realist movement.
He recognizes, however, that "it goes beyond American Legal Realism in many respects, including its comprehensive framework, its
franker vocalizing and use of values, its more expansive concept of
law as fashioned by all of officialdom instead of courts, legislators,
' 52
and administrators, and in its linguistic assumptions.
Judge Dillard admittedly locates himself within the American
realist movement in espousing an approach to law in which biases
and value judgments are placed openly on the table for all to judge.
His review of Corbin's The Law of Contracts, for example, illustrates his recognition of a telelogical or purposive aspect of law,
and yet this purposive element must be identified for all to see,
removed from any claim of a priorivalidity.5 3 Thus, Judge Dillard
is able to praise Corbin for his "patient genius" and his congeniality to the realist movement while castigating Williston for the
"allegedly cramping effect of his logically constructed system:"5 4
The anti-pragmatist will suggest that it is impossible to tell how a
rule works without some notion of what it is working toward, i.e.,
without some notion of end or purpose. How is this end to be
determined? The answer, however stated, requires a value judgment
which is no less real and pervasive because too often ignored."
50. Id. at 627.
51. Moore, Prolegomenonto the Jurisprudenceof Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell, 54 VA. L. REv. 622, 672 (1968).
52. Dillard, supra note 49, at 631.
53. Book Review, 5 J. LEGA EDuc. 387 (1953).
54. Id. at 388.
55. Id. at 389.
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Judge Dillard obviously accepts much that is common to pragmatism, realism, and the McDougal-Lasswell method, and his views
can hardly be characterized as belonging primarily to any one
school of thought.
Both McDougal and Lasswell apparently would claim Judge Dillard as a member of their camp. Citations to their work in Judge
Dillard's publications are intended to show how closely Judge Dillard shares their view that law is value-oriented and that basic goal
values should be clarified and implemented: Judge Dillard
"unhesitatingly proclaims the need for the postulation, as contrasted with the derivation, of a comprehensive set of goal values,
and he explicitly joins with the present writers in recommending
postulation of the basic goal values of human dignity."56 While this
analysis may be technically correct, McDougal and Lasswell considerably overstate the point, since Judge Dillard would join a
number of critics of the policy-oriented approach who maintain
that for instances of practical adjudication it becomes unwieldy:
The trouble with [McDougal's] approach is that it's simply too
global, and his rhetoric is a little too incomprehensible to busy people who have to argue and decide cases. But he's right in the sense
that he insists that you keep alive the ultimate aims and purposes.
Of course, he wants to combine a sort of natural law concept,
namely that the ends or purposes are important, with a scientific
concept so that you should bring to bear in trying to decide
everything, all the evidence of any kind bearing on every issue.5
Although recognizing that McDougal himself would deny the presence of natural law in his theory, Judge Dillard- explains his own
relationship to natural law theory in terms of the intersection between natural and positive law:
I have always viewed natural law in the context of what I referred
to in my lectures as "the intersection concept." When describing
these inherently vague standards, it seems to me that one must look
to the purpose or object of the particular pronouncement in question, whether it is a municipal ordinance, a legislative statute, or a
constitutional provision. After ascertaining as closely as possible the
object or purpose of the pronouncement, one must then determine
empirically whether any evidence exists of that object or purpose
which is teleological .... I say that the moment that that analysis

is begun and some standard is sought, then natural law is infusing
itself into the body of the positive law .... [The ultimate question
56. McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 2, at 592.
57. Interview H,supra note 38.
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thus is] what is positive law? [One cannot] assume that positive
law is simply a closed book with rigid rules. Viewed realistically,
then, these standards of the positive law are infused with meaning
by looking to what the natural law advocates would insist is "object
and purpose. . ." It is not as if an antinomy exists between natural law and positive law. The natural law is a sort of midwife helping
to determine the nature of the positive law. It is reason tempering
fiat."

Hardy Dillard's jurisprudence is thus an eclectic blend of pragmatism, positivism, legal realism, and policy-orientation with elements of natural law being infused to assist in giving content to
the law's "object and purpose." In a 1941 review of Fuller's The
Law in Quest of Itself, Judge Dillard described the natural law
adherents as claiming a monopoly on the "ought" questions, while
the realists would deny both the importance and "pervasive existence" of the "ought." 59 Judge Dillard has always praised the need
for "legal imagination,""0 and his refusal to accept any one school
of jurisprudence has prevented his approach to legal controversies
from becoming rigid or facile. Recognizing that jurisprudence involves the task of "exploring and classifying the concepts and relations internal to law,""1 he notes that law is useful to modem man
because it provides a sense of security, yet the reemergence of
natural law concepts has led to a revived interest in the so-called
fundamental principles on which that security is based.
Typical of Judge Dillard's style is an anecdote which he recites
frequently and which he attributes to The New Yorker. "Between
scepticism on the one hand and dogmatism on the other hand,
there is a middle way, which is our way-open-minded certainty."" For a judge, open-minded certainty represents an attitude combining scholarly questioning of alternatives and rationales with the realization that eventually decisions have to be made
and the luxury of scholarly endeavors must yield to the pressures
of decision-making. "I've always felt that there were two things
that helped intellectually to gain a mastery of material. One is to
press back for assumptions, and the other is to push forward to
consequences, in order to see what the result is likely to be. 6' 3 From
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Book Review, 27 VA. L. Rav. 568, 570 (1941).
Dillard, Commentary, 21 U. MAI~ L. Rv.532, 533 (1967).
Book Review, 38 VA. L. REV. 703, 703 n.2 (1952).
Dillard, supra note 60, at 532.
Interview II, supra note 38.
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a practical perspective, the ability to digest a tremendous volume
of material, to ask the proper questions of counsel-especially
when the documentation frequently runs into the tens of thousands
of pages-has proved a major difficulty for an individual judge on
the International Court of Justice working without clerks or secretarial assistance. In the Advisory Opinion on South West Africa
(Namibia)," for example, Judge Dillard attempted to circumvent
the mountains of compiled documents by asking one question to
counsel for South Africa: "Does not the theory of your case lead to
the conclusion that South Africa is legally privileged to annex
South West Africa if it chooses to do so? ' ' 5 The counsel responded
that it did, and for Judge Dillard, that answer "came close to the
heart of the case."" His question had asked for an explanation of
both the assumptions behind and the consequences of South Africa's position.
Similarly, in the Cod War Cases,8" which involved the unilateral
extension of fishing rights by Iceland and the contravention of a
treaty with Great Britain and West Germany, Great Britain maintained that Iceland's actions violated international law. In probing
the nature of the three submissions by Great Britain,"8 Judge Dillard asked Great Britain's counsel whether it was necessary to
decide the first submission before being able to reach the other
two. Counsel responded in the negative, and Judge Dillard found
that he did not have to belabor the first submission. Judge Dillard
later stated:
I was trying to reconcile two things. As Pound's famous statement
suggests, the fundamental problem of law is to reconcile the conflicting needs of stability and change. Law must be stable, yet it
can not stand still. At this juncture there is a little creative role for
the judge. It seemed to me to be freezing things too much to respond to that first submission in view of the many changes that
were going on at that time. Another big problem with Pound discusses in his Introduction to the Philosophy of Law-which I
practically committed to memory-is a problem that confronts the
Court that people do not seem to talk about. The problem is more
conspicious in international than in national litigation, and is this:
64. [19711 I.C.J. 9.
65. Interview I, supra note 29.

66. Id.
67.

Fisheries Jurisdiction Case [1974] I.C.J. 3, 60 (Fisheries Jurisdiction

Case, opinion of Judge Dillard).
68. The submissions may be found in Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, Judgment
[1974] I.C.J. at 16.
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how to reconcile the need for generality. . . with the need to take
into account the particular . . . .In the Cod War Cases, we had
created in effect a classification. Iceland was especially dependent
upon fisheries, so we took that into account by giving her preferential rights, as opposed to those nations which did not already have
treaty rights .. . .Here we had a general rule, and yet we filled
the particularities of that problem. . . by giving her something as
well. Such a resolution would never have occurred to me if I had
not had a jurisprudential background.69
This concern with the creation of a sense of harmony between the
general and the particular is an inescapable aspect of international
adjudication and dispute settlement. Not only are the prevailing
norms themselves often unclear, but all too frequently the facts
from which any such norms must be derived are either incapable
of precise delineation or too complex to assimilate intelligently.
"In the national domain, you have 200 million people in the United
States. Their similarities are more important than their differences
. . . . With [the international scene], it's the other way
around."70 Although generalities such as freedom of the seas, free
transit, and innocent passage do exist and apply universally without reference to any particularities, one cannot go very long in
judicial adjudication without having to accommodate emerging
particularities.
IV.

THE CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COURT

Many of the jurisprudential concerns of the various "schools"
discussed in this article have played a role in the jurisprudence of
the International Court of Justice. In his dissenting opinion in the
South West Africa Cases,71 Judge Tanaka noted that particular
facts relating to the parties involved should be given as much
consideration as any statutory pronouncement. "We, therefore,
must recognize that social and individual necessity constitutes one
of the guiding factors for the development of law by the way of
interpretation as well as legislation. 7' 2 In his view, the gulf between
the majority and the minority on the Court could be "attributed
to the difference between two methods of interpretation: teleological or sociological and conceptual or formalistic. ' 73 The distinction
69.

Interview I, supra note 29.

70. Id.

71. [1966] I.C.J. 7, 250.
72. Id. at 277.
73.

Id. at 278.
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between the two approaches involves the willingness of a judge to
extrapolate an applicable norm from a set of factual conditions,
taking into consideration previous precedents and future outcomes. The positivists seem to have been more cautious in contexts
involving the possible creation of norms, whereas the sociological
school has been less reluctant to engage in such innovation. John
Dugard has recently observed this jurisprudential "schism" on the
Court and has characterized it as follows:
Two main jurisprudential approaches have surfaced in the recent
judgments and opinions of the Court-the positivist (or formalist)
and the teleological (or sociological). Positivists see international
law as a body of rules to which States have consented and stress
State sovereignty as the cornerstone of the international legal order.
As a consequence, they adopt a highly cautious approach to judicial
innovation and to the creation of new rules of customary law. Opposed to this school are those who emphasize the community interest over State sovereignty, and who are prepared to accept the innovative role of the judge and the accelerated growth of custom in an
interdependent world. .

.

. In the field of treaty interpretation this

group is often described as the teleological school, for it seeks to give
maximum effect to the object and purpose of treaties."
It is apparent that Judge Dillard's conception of natural law
intersecting with positive law places him in both the formalist and
sociological schools of thought. Institutionally, however, one might
imagine that the positivists would play a more dominant role on a
court in which contentious cases are often of high political salience
and the majority of the judges are drawn from .domestic experience, such as elective office or service in foreign affairs where political inputs are generally significant in dispute settlement. If the
facts involved in international adjudication are so diverse and
complex, reflecting numerous national traditions and customs,
then a court composed of judges coming from different historical,
cultural, and legal backgrounds can hardly be expected to forge
decisions which are of uniform application, acceptability, and persuasiveness to all nations in the world:
74. Dugard, The Nuclear Tests Cases and the South West Africa Cases:Some
Realism About the InternationalJudicial Decision, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 463, 495
(1976) (footnote omitted).
75. Both the South West Africa Cases and the Nuclear Tests Cases can be
considered more "realistic" in the sense of representing outcomes consonant with
the realist position. Id. at 491. Judge Dillard remarks that he is probably more of
a professor than most international lawyers. Interview I, supra note 29. For a
comprehensive curriculum vitae of Judge Dillard, see [1975-19761 I.C.J.Y.B. 19.
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The many intangibles that contribute to a nation's style and stance,
that give to its expressions of policy and purpose their peculiar tone
and flavor are too often ignored by those who measure significance
only in terms of concrete decisions and specific issues. The exhibited
habits of thought of decision makers may transcend in importance
the decision itself. 6
On the basis of these factors alone decisions from the International
Court of Justice could be expected to turn on relatively narrow,
unadventurous, and, to the extent possible, noncontroversial or
nonideological considerations. Since the process of norm acceptance in international law is much slower than the institutional
assimilation possible in most domestic arenas, one could further
predict a greater tendency on the part of states to employ the
Court's adjudicatory capacities. At the same time, where norms
are vague or merely nascent, the relative uncertainty as to outcome
undoubtedly accounts for what one author calls the Court's
"august indolence."7 7
V.

MEMBERSHIP ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

This section will explore Judge Dillard's perceptions of the institutional features of the Court with a view toward evaluating the
Court as an international decision-making body and examining the
degree to which the Court's physical structure influences its jurisprudential results.
A.

Appointment

With characteristic modesty, Judge Dillard claims that his appointment to the International Court of Justice came as a total
surprise to him, as he had, in fact, been recommending two other
candidates. Although he attributes his appointment to having
been President of and active in the American Society of International Law for several years, he confesses that he had to "bone up"
quite a bit before joining the Court. 8 At the time of his appointment in February 1970, however, the Court had been fairly inactive. Judge Dillard is quite fond of recounting the article in the
Richmond Times-Dispatch which greeted his arrival at the
Twenty-fifth Opening Session of the Court:
Q. REv. 51, 59 (1968).

76.

Dillard, Minds and Moods, 44 VA.

77.

Claude, States and the World Court: The Politics of Neglect, 11 VA. J.

INT'L L. 344, 344 (1971).

78. Interview I, supra note 29.
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Prestige Ranks High, Influence Low as World Court
Opens 25th Session
The Judgeships are considered prime plums. They pay a tax-free
salary. The job is a prestigious, luxurious, sinecure which displeases activists like Philip C. Jessup (who preceded Hardy C. Dillard) but pleases the elderly and the infirm who often populate the
Court."
The underutilization of the Court's resources has, nonetheless,
continued to be an embarrassment throughout Judge Dillard's
term as a judge, and the criticisms have continued to grow at an
unfortunate rate.
B.

Criticism of the Court

One recent study of the Court's effectiveness asserted that the
Court "attracts scholarly attention primarily for its inactivity."8
The authors appeared to condemn the Court when they added that
it "cannot be credited with directly settling any of the disputes
dealing with the East-West conflict, decolonization, or control over
natural resources environmental concerns. The majority of the disputes on which the Court has made merit or nonmerit judgments
have been localized and peripheral to major international problems."'" This assessment certainly expects too much from an international organ consisting of fifteen fallible judges. It has been suggested that "[t]he proper role for the Court lies in promoting
unification in the interpretation and application of international
law . . . and contributing thereby to the rule of law and greater
integration of the international society." 2 Compared with the
present docket congestion of the United States Supreme Court, the
twenty-six judgments and fourteen advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice in thirty years is a pitifully small number
of judicial decisions. On the other hand, considering the rate of
change in the post-World War II era and the severe stress encountered on all fronts, economic, political, and social," a "world"
court can hardly be expected to locate generally accepted norms
and practices which can be invoked to dispose of hotly contested
political controversies.
79. Reported in Dillard, supra note 13, at 299.
80. J. GAMBLE & D. FISCHER, THE INTERNATIONAL

COURT OF JUSTICE 1

(1976).

81. Id. at 72.
82. Gross, The InternationalCourt of Justice: Considerationof Requirements
for EnhancingIts Role in the InternationalLegal Order, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 253,
259 (1971).
83. See generally A. BucHAN, THE END OF THE POSTWAR ERA (1974).
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The Court, then, seems to function within the confines of two
sets of constraints which make the "judicial activism" of the
United States Supreme Court under Chief Justice Warren84 an
improbable model for the International Court of Justice to follow.
First, institutional constraints in the organization and operation of
the Court are present which tend to inhibit the type of decisionmaking which is characteristic of many common law countries.
Second, jurisprudential constraints exist which, due to the nature
of the facts presented before the Court in its contentious cases and
advisory opinions, tend to give the Court a "positivist" slant, at
least insofar as the judges are inclined to be fairly cautious in their
decisions.
1.

Institutional Constraints

A tendency of many critics of the Court has been to chastise it
for having failed to accomplish the impossible. For example, Eberhard Deutsch has remarked that "[i]t should be borne in mind
that the Court has never yet decided a case which has saved the
United Nations from getting into a Third World War, nor did it
stop the Second." Yet this habit of mind, whether prompted by
scholarly reflection or ideological concern, fails to reflect on the
true nature of the Court, its purposes, and its inherent limitations:
[I]t must be recalled that cases before the ICJ are more likely to
be deeply rooted in history than is true in the national domain and
furthermore the Court, except to a very limited extent (as in the
ICAO case), is not an appellate court but both a court of first instance and a final court. This means, of course, that it must grapple
with basic facts uninformed by the sifting and distilling process
which progress through lower courts provides. The structured process helps to lift out for emphasis and discussion those facts deemed
most compelling.
The fact that the Court also lacks a readily identifiable constituency not only helps to explain the reluctance of the Court to
enunciate bold normative pronouncements on international legal
issues, but also means that any legitimizing function that the
Court can play in gathering support for a controversial decision is
84. See, e.g., Kurland, 1970 Term: Notes on the Emergence of the Burger
Court, 1971 Sup. CT. REv. 265, 298-305.
85. Deutsch, The InternationalCourt of Justice, 5 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 35, 41
(1972).
86. Dillard, supra note 13, at 303-04.
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consequently minimized."7
Three years after his appointment to the Court, Judge Dillard
publicly remarked that he had come to "appreciate the virtues of
the system," noting that the Court's various internal structural
procedures "draw on both the common and civil law systems and
thus reveal both the strength and weakness which compromises so
frequently manifest.""8 The physical processes of judicial decisionmaking tend to reinforce the Court's unwillingness to render decisions swollen with dicta, although the various sequential stages
during which an opinion or a dissent is forged unquestionably help
facilitate an overall consensus which compensates to some degree
for the different legal and cultural backgrounds of the judges. 9
From an institutional standpoint, although the actual size of the
Court would seem to facilitate effective small group decisionmaking, nothing in the drafting process of the Court is comparable
to the reportedly candid discussions which occur during the United
States Supreme Court's weekly conferences. 0 In fact, the current
process of reaching a decision is calculated to minimize the interpersonal contact characteristic of effective small group decisionmaking.
Life at The Hague for the typical judge on the Court seems to
be a decidedly lonesome existence.9 Not only is there very little
fraternization among judges and members of their families, but the
intellectual process demanded in hearing cases and deciding them
is a similarly solitary endeavor. Language barriers notwithstanding, Judge Dillard has observed that once the President of the
Court has circulated a list of the "issues" to be considered in
deciding a particular case, the first step in the decision-making
process-the preparation of the individual judge's Private
Note-"may have the tendency, since it is committed to writing,
of psychologically freezing the point of view it expresses."9 The
chance of any serious interchange among judges after the Notes
87. The ability of an international court to marshall such support is obviously
limited. The United States Supreme Court, for example, has a much narrower
constituency to which it can appeal. Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion in
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), represented not only a "legal"
decision but was explicitly presented so as to appeal to the populace at large.
Many national newspapers, for example, printed the opinion in its entirety.
88. Dillard, supra note 13, at 301.
89. Id. at 303.
90. See J. WILKINSON, SERVING JUSTICE 40-42 (1974).
91. Interview I, supra note 29.

92. Dillard, supra note 13, at 302.
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have been written is further undermined by the fact that "they are
distributed anonymously, in order, presumably, to minimize the
potential influence of one judge on another."9 Although a consensus may appear to result from this institutional procedure designed
to accommodate fifteen judges of varying backgrounds, the opportunity for an effective yet nondivisive dissent or qualified concurrence is reduced, creating a "peculiar dilemma for a judge who may
wish to avoid weakening the majority opinion but may yet wince
at some of the reasons advanced in support of it."" Once the Private Notes have been circulated, most of the formal "debating" as
to issues and positions has been finished. Although the next step
includes a series of deliberations, these too are structured with
each judge defending or modifying his Private Note, the authorship of which is now obvious. Thus, the bulk of the decisionmaking is a function of penmanship with very little opportunity for
personal exchanges which can be so effective in the traditional
small group decision-making context."
Final opinions by the Court are written by members of the Drafting Committee, which is elected by secret ballot and whose members remain anonymous. The forging of a Drafting Committee
opinion is a difficult process, since it requires accommodation of
many views and issues typically present in a majority position."
When reviewing our operative clauses, each judge is supposed to
state whether he agrees with the judgment. A judge can not abstain
This makes for a little dilemma sometimes if a judge agrees
....
with the result but does not altogether agree with the rationale. A
judge in that situation will write an individual opinion ....

For

my part, I have tried not to be a "nitpicker," and if I could go along
with the majority and support not only the judgment but also the
reasoning . . . I would do it. Dissenting, however, is a different

matter. Your target in dissent really is, I think, the sophisticated
"Court watchers."97
Although opportunity for criticism of the Drafting Committee's
initial opinion is possible, no evidence exists that such criticism
produces substantial change in individual judges' attitudes. Similarly, there have been indications that even in joint dissents after
the dissenters had discussed things among themselves, the actual
93. Id.
94. Id. at 303.
95. See id. at 302 n.7.

96. Interview I, supra note 29.
97.

Id.
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written opinion with a joint effort in which individual judges
divided up particular aspects of the opinion. 8
After Private Notes are circulated, the Court meets again and
individual judges can present oral defenses of their opinions. This
stage is probably the closest a judge comes to revising his views,
although the psychological impact of having already written something can be inhibiting. At this stage, a majority becomes apparent, and a Drafting Committee is elected. Once this Committee
reports back to the full Court with a draft opinion, it is read aloud
and any dissents must then be announced. No changes in views are
allowed, and the Committee meets again to prepare a second and
ordinarily final draft in light of the comments -of all the judges,
dissenters included.9
The practice of the Drafting Committee, including its membership, is a "deep, dark secret." The members usually meet around
a big table using headphones for interpretation whenever necessary. Yet, even at this final period very little "hard bargaining" or
tradeoffs are made.
Brandeis once said of Justice Day that he could never be persuaded
by anyone but himself. It's a little bit like that with us too. You
don't sway these fellows much. They're all independently minded
* * 'I have changed a nuance here or there ....
It's a tortured,
a lonely job ....
You are not quite sure you are right. In the
Western Sahara Case . . . I was awfully uncertain because it was
so deeply rooted in history ....
I was sure I was right on one point,

but I was not sure that I had enough feel for the history of it to be
sure that I was fair.'
It is frequently difficult to guess from results alone the nature of
the debates which may have occurred among the judges. For example, a judge may not feel the need to write a separate opinion
because the majority opinion already reflects his views, either because he actually sat on the Drafting Committee or because in the
course of submitting written and oral comments on three Draft
Opinions of the Drafting Committee, he discovers that his views
have been accepted."'
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. The possibility for modification of individual judges' views, however, can
evolve during the several stages in which a case is presented. See, for example,
the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases, in Which Judge Dillard submitted no separate

opinions. Those cases involved three stages. First, the Request for Interim Measures of Protection resulting in Orders of the Court in 1972. Federal Republic of
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In discussing his views on the overall structure of the Court's
decision-making process, Judge Dillard observes that "the kind of
exchange of views required by the Court's process of decisionmaking tends inevitably to dampen, by mutual exposure, the pull
of nationalistic and idealistic affinities." '0' The fear of many states
that nationalistic biases of judges on the Court will play a major
role in final outcomes"°3 helps to account for the structural rigidities in the Court's operations, reinforcing its tendency to adopt a
cautious approach. No evidence exists, however, that this cautiousness and serious concern for avoiding nationalist bias has increased the willingness of states to bring cases before the Court.
Supporters of Court reform might reevaluate whether elimination
of many of these structural requirements, affording more candid
exchanges between judges, would have any impact whatever on the
Court's future docket. If not, then nationalist bias merely prevents
a more robust airing of the issues before the Court in a given case.
Members of the Court themselves have criticized this process, especially the speed with which the Private Notes are written. "We
should have discussed the issues more. In our recent revision of
internal judicial practice we have changed this, but we have not
yet put it into practice."10'
2. Jurisprudential Constraints
The jurisprudential constraints facing the Court are a function
of both the factual nature of international law and the structure
of the Court itself. It is virtually impossible to determine whether
these constraints dictate the structure and, if so, to what degree.
The picture which emerges is one of a cautious Court in contradistinction to the United Nations, of which it is the principal judicial
organ. The overall view of the Court is one of a positivist-oriented
Germany v. Iceland, Interim Order, [1972] I.C.J. 35; United Kingdom v. Iceland, Interim Order, [1972] I.C.J. 17. Occasionally these orders can be very

complicated, with individual judges writing separate and dissenting opinions.
Second, the judgments of the Court on Jurisdictional Issues may provide another
occasion, see, e.g., Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland, [1973] I.C.J. 45;
United Kingdom v. Iceland, [1973] I.C.J. 3, with the final occasion being the
judgments on the merits, see Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland, Judgment,
[1974] I.C.J. 175; United Kingdom v. Iceland, [1974] I.C.J. 3. See also Aegean
Sea Continental Shelf, Interim Protection Order [1976] I.C.J. 3.
102. Dillard, supra note 13, at 304 (emphasis added).
103. For an analysis of nationalist influences in the nominating process for
membership on the Court, see Golden, supra note 8.
104. Interview I, supra note 29.
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adjudicatory group in which final outcomes are often the products
of difficult compromises. The curious result, however, is that the
Court's critics both fear the likelihood of the Court rendering politically controversial decisions and chastise it for its positivistic caution. Ironically, those structures intended to relieve the former fear
are among the chief causes of the latter's shortcoming, if a cautious
approach can be so viewed. One creative by-product of the criticisms leveled at the Court is that it becomes directly involved in
one of the central questions in contemporary international jurisprudence-how fast or how slow should normative change be? The
final effect is to place the Court at the very center of this current
tension in world affairs. Jurisprudential questions involving not
merely Pound's social interest theory but what might be called a
societal interest theory emerge and become overtly politicized. As
Pound once wrote in the early twenties,
International law was born of juristic speculation and became a
reality because that speculation gave men something by which to
make and shape international legal institutions and a belief that
they could make and shape them effectively. Juristic pessimism has
given us instead an international regime of conferences, proceeding
by a method of bargain, establishing nothing certainly and giving
results which are confessedly as temporary as they are usually arbitrary. No conference can do more than it pictures itself able to do.
We may at times build better than we know, but not better than
we believe."05
The salient question for the future of the Court is whether it helps
to shape these events or is, in the end, shaped by them.

VI. TmE DILLARD

OPINIONS

A principal thesis of this article has been that because of the
historical, cultural, political, and legal facts which make up the
subject matter of international law, rapid jurisprudential development on the basis of a consensus of shared values is an unlikely
phenomenon. This is not to say that international law is more
static than municipal law, but simply to recognize that it does not
change as rapidly. One might even say that major changes, once
recognized, undergo a long gestation period in which a slow, frequently tedious, process of "legitimizing" takes place until eventually a new aspect of customary international law has been recognized. A recent example of this ferment and legitimization process
105.

Pound, supra note 15, at 88.
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is the decade-old search by the United Nations Law of the Sea
Conference for a viable regime for exploitation of deep seabed resources.'"'
Through its settlement of contentious cases and its advisory
opinions, the International Court of Justice can serve not only in
this legitimizing capacity which recognizes and solidifies an international consensus, but can also contribute to the gradual emergence of a new norm. Thus, as the Court said with regard to the tenmile rule for bays in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case,
[T]he Court deems it necessary to point out that although the
ten-mile rule has been adopted by certain States both in their national law and in their treaties and conventions, and although certain arbitral decisions have applied it as between these States, other
States have adopted a different limit. Consequently, the ten-mile
rule 1has
not acquired the authority of a general rule of international
07
law.

As Judge Dillard remarked in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case,
"The authority of the International Court of Justice is sometimes
invoked in support of a quasi-universalist, as opposed to a consensus theory of customary international law." ' The earlier sections
of this article, however, developed the view that constraints of both
an institutional nature as well as of a jurisprudential nature limited the likelihood of the Court's rendering teleologically oriented
or "quasi-universalist" decisions. Judging from Hardy Dillard's
pre-Court writings and observations, we would expect to find him
approaching cases from the perspective of the legal realist, yet not
totally ignoring the natural law elements, the "object and purpose" features, pertinent in a given consideration. Our inquiry will
now turn to an assessment of his official views as a member of the
Court.
106. See Conant & Conant, Resource Development and the Seabed Regime
of UNCLOS HI: A Suggestion for Compromise, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 61 (1977);
Moore, In Search of Common Nodules at UNCLOS III, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1977);
Smith, The Seabed Negotiation and the Law of the Sea Conference-Ready for
a Divorce?, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 43 (1977).
107. [1951] I.C.J. 116, 131.
108. [1974] I.C.J. at 58.
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A. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)11

The first opinion written by Judge Dillard was a separate opinion in the Namibia case in which he accepted the Court's reasoning
as to the illegality of South Africa's annexation of South West
Africa. For Judge Dillard the problem was one yielding to a logical
solution. South Africa had contended "that no legal provision prevents its annexing South West Africa" in spite of the lapsing of the
Mandate. 10 Yet Judge Dillard was persuaded by the Court's 1950
Advisory Opinion which was repeated with approval in the 1962
Judgement: "The authority which the Union government exercises
over the Territory is based on the Mandate. If the Mandate lapsed,
as the Union government contends, the latter's authority would
equally have lapsed. To retain the rights derived from the Mandate and to deny the obligations thereunder could not be justified.""' More than logic, however, dictated the result, since both
the historical assumptions on which the Mandate system was
founded" 2 as well as recent political action by the United Nationsi ' were explicit in articulating the view that the conflict was

between South Africa and the United Nations system as a whole:
"The insistent and reiterated efforts of the United Nations to negotiate with South Africa represented something more than the expression of General Assembly political action. It represented a
sense of continuity in the international community's concept of
South Africa's obligations and the responsibilities incumbent on
the United Nations."' The Security Council's Resolution 276"1
simply converted the General Assembly's recommendation into "a
binding decision operative as against non-consenting States."11 6
The thrust of Judge Dillard's opinion was two-fold. First, he was
deeply concerned that the action taken by the General Assembly
and implicitly before the Court through its consideration of Reso109.

[1971] I.C.J. 16.

110. Id. at 159.

111. Id. at 158.
112. See the League of Nations publication, THE MANDATES SYSTEM: ORIGIN,
PRINCIPLES, APPLICATION, quoted in Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners, I.C.J.
Pleadings, 28-35 (1971).

113. See, e.g., 21 U.N. GAOR (1448th plen. mtg.) 4-5, U.N. Doc. A/PV. 1448
(1966).

114. [1971] I.C.J. at 161.
115.

25 U.N. SCOR (1529th mtg.) 1, U.N. Doc. S/INF/25 (1970).

116. [1971] I.C.J. at 164.
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lution 276, would be viewed as motivated purely by ideologies,
steeped in politics rather than legal reasoning:
General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI) was a political decision
with far reaching practical implications. But it was not an arbitrary
exercise of political power outside a legal frame of reference. Its
endowment of supervisory power over the Mandate had been confirmed by the jurisprudence of this Court and the scope of that
power, as indicated in the Opinion, included the power ultimately
to terminate for material breach."'
Clearly Judge Dillard was marshalling the evidence to legitimate
the legal norms underlying a rather controversial yet carefully considered political act of power. His goal was institutional legitimacy
for the historical relevance of the Mandate, for the General Assembly, for the Security Council, and for the Court itself since each of
these factors had already been of importance in U.N. deliberations
on the subject. In a Court without a firm stare decisis background,
Judge Dillard's opinion may be seen as legitimizing the sources of
decision-making at the level of the Court in the light of United
Nations actions which were controversial and politically motivated: "A court can hardly be expected to pronounce upon legal
consequences unless the resolutions from which the legal consequences flow were themselves free of legal conclusions affecting the
consequences." ' Realizing that the request for an advisory opinion on Namibia would embroil the Court in the heart of a heated
debate, he was careful to avoid subjecting the Court's response to
political attack as well:
[W]hen these organs [of the United Nations] do see fit to ask for
an advisory opinion, they must expect the Court to act in strict
accordance with its judicial function. This function precludes it
from accepting, without any inquiry whatever, a legal conclusion
which itself conditions the nature and scope of the legal consequences flowing from it. It would be otherwise if the resolution requesting an opinion were legally neutral as in the three previous
requests for advisory opinions bearing on the Mandate."9
Because a view of the Court as a dependent political,rather than
independent judicial, arm of the United Nations would serve to
reduce its effectiveness substantially,' Judge Dillard felt the need
117. Id. at 168.
118. Id. at 151.
119. Id.
120. The Court's failure, however, to rule on the issue of the compatibility of
apartheid with the U.N. Mandate for South West Africa in the South West Africa

636

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

IV61. 11:609

to "fortify" his conclusions with "data of an historical, legal and
2
logical character in addition to that supplied in the opinion.",

The second thrust of his opinion lies in the directions both of
legitimizing and mollifying. Whereas one aspect of legitimacy was
in a global context, a second aspect of legitimacy had to do with
an individual nation, South Africa, which was bearing the full
force and scrutiny of what appeared to be the entire United Nations system. Judge Dillard rejected the majority's position that
South Africa should be denied a judge ad hoc for the proceedings
before the Court. 2 ' Knowing in advance of the United Nations'
Cases, [19661 I.C.J. 1, has prompted one commentator to note that the Court's
behavior "exposed [it] to widespread vilification and abuse." Dugard, supra
note 74, at 464.
121. [19711 I.C.J. at 162 (emphasis added). He went on to add:
The records tracing the history of the mandates system are comprehensive
and have been the subject of elaborate analysis in the three previous Advisory Opinions and the two Judgments rendered throughout the long history
of the controversy over South Africa's administration of the Mandate.
Much depends on the way these records and events are viewed. My own
reading leads me to believe that the legal power to "revoke" the Mandate
for a material breach was inherent in the system ....
Id.
122. An assessment of the admission of ad hoc judges maybe found in Pomerance, The Admission of Judges Ad Hoc in Advisory Proceedings:Some Reflections in the Light of the Namibia Case, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 446 (1973). Pomerance
notes that while one group of the judges would have granted South Africa's
application for a judge ad hoc on grounds of law and equity, Judge Dillard, relying
solely on art. 68 of the Court's statute, would have allowed the admission on
equity alone. Id. at 459. The author suggests two reasons for the Court's denial
of admission: First, this "restrictive approach . . . undoubtedly accords with

long-standing academic criticism of [the ad hoc judge] as an undesirable vestige
of the concept of arbitration grafted onto the Court and detracting from that
body's role as an international 'magistrature."' Id. at 462. Second, Pomerance
suggests that the Court has developed a general policy as to advisory opinions
whereby:
in contrast to the PCIJ, the present Court has tended to ignore and isolate
the quasi-contentious elements involved in advisory opinions and to view
all requests in a strictly formalistic light as matters concerning solely the
requesting organ and the Court. This tendency of the ICJ has gone hand in
hand with the enunciation of a new doctrine, based on the organic relationship between the Court and the UN and involving a duty to cooperate with
UN organs barring compelling countervailing reasons.
Id. Although this theory, if correct, would not serve to "legitimize" decisions by
the Court in the sense of isolating them from political criticism, there is a degree
to which a formalistic approach can, by narrowing an issue, prevent it from
becoming over-politicized. In other words, although the Court may feel some duty
as the U.N.'s "principal judicial organ," a formalistic approach may help defuse
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political condemnation of South Africa's efforts to annex South
West Africa, Judge Dillard felt that in such a highly charged political atmosphere, permitting a judge ad hoc might rebut any impression that parties were "ganging up" on South Africa:
Since the interests of South Africa were so critically involved the
appointment of a judge ad hoc would have assured the Court that
those interests would have been viewed through the perspective of
one thoroughly familiar with them. Furthermore should the Opinion
of the Court have been unfavourable to the interests of South Africa,
the presence on the Court of a judge ad hoc, even in a dissenting
capacity, would have added rather than detracted from the probative value of the Opinion."'
Toward the end of his opinion, Judge Dillard remarked that "the
great learning and consummate skill brought to bear on the issues
by the representatives of South Africa were in the highest tradition
1
of the legal profession."

24

The majority's opinion in the Namibia case has been described
as adopting a "dynamic, teleological approach.

12 5

Judge Dillard's

separate opinion, however, might also be called "dynamic," representing a blend of both legal realism and "object and purpose"
analysis. It came to grips with the political reality of the Namibian
question, and at the same time attempted to legitimize the Court's
handling of the situation, at least in the eyes of the world community and to whatever degree possible, South Africa's as well. He
noted the difficulties which arise "when obligations originally assumed [i.e., the Mandate] are disrupted by the happening of
unexpected events" like World War II, the death of the League of
Nations, and the birth of the United Nations. 121 Changed circum-

stances, however, are an insufficient reason for failure to grapple
with the situation, and actually provide the historical, political,
and practical rationale for interpreting the Mandate in terms of
both context and "object and purpose":
[W]henever a long-term engagement . . . is so interrupted, emphasis in attempting a reasonable interpretation and construction
broadly enunciated political norms, thereby exercising a restraining influence on
the U.N. itself.
123. [1971] I.C.J. at 153.
124. Id. at 168.
125. Dugard, supra note 74, at 476. See generally Dugard, The Opinion on
South West Africa ("Namibia"): The Teleologists Triumph, 88 S. AFR. L.J. 460
(1971).
126. [19711 I.C.J. at 157.
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of its meaning and the obligations it imposes shifts from a textual
analysis to one which stresses-the object and purpose of the engagement in light of the total context in which the engagement was
located. This generalization can be amply supported by recourse to
"the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" as
revealed in the application of doctrines of impossibility and frustration to long-term engagements.'1
In summary, Judge Dillard's opinion in the Namibia case can be
classified as neither teleological nor positivist but a blend of the
two which corrects what may be perceived as an imbalance in the
majority's reasoning.
B.

Appeal Relating to the Jurisdictionof the ICA 0 Council
12
(India v. Pakistan)

In the ICAO opinion, the Court dealt with an appeal by India
from the International Civil Aviation Organization's decision that
Indian aircraft flying over Pakistan were in violation of the Convention on International Civil Aviation129 and the International Air
Services Transit Agreement. 3 ' India maintained in its Application
that "[t]he Council has no jurisdiction to handle the matters
presented by the Respondent' [Pakistan] in its Application and
Complaint, as the Convention and the Transit Agreement have
been terminated or suspended as between the two States,""' ' and
in its Memorial that "[t]he manner and method employed by the
Council in reaching its decision render the decision improper, unfair and prejudicial to India and bad in law."' 32 Pakistan argued
that the Court lacked competence and jurisdiction to hear India's
appeal from the adverse ICAO decision. The Court, however, rejected Pakistan's contention, and by a fourteen-to-two vote held
that the ICAO Council could entertain Pakistan's initial complaint
against India and that India's appeal against the Council's jurisdiction should be rejected.
One of the central questions in international law is the
''maximum area of autonomy" which the system's rules allow to
individual States.'3 3 A schizophrenic tension exists to the extent
127. Id. See also id. at 158.
128. [1972] I.C.J. 46.
129. Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat. 1516, T.I.A.S. No. 469, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.

130. Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 84 U.N.T.S. 389.
131. [1972] I.C.J. at 49.
132. Id.
133. H.L.A.

HART,

supra note 16, at 218.
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that the current system conceives of its member states as both
simultaneously sovereign and subject to legal constraints. Judge
Dillard, writing an independent opinion in the ICA 0 case, characterizes the jurisdictional issue at stake in terms of this tension.
Pakistan had requested the Council to condemn India's suspension of flights of its aircraft over Indian territory as creating
"injustice, hardship, loss and injury to Pakistan."' As in the
Namibia case, Judge Dillard sought his answer by consideration
of the logical elements of the controversy and the sources of the
legal rights underlying the presence or absence of the Council's
jurisdiction. Early in the opinion, he noted that "[a]s a general
rule any organ endowed with jurisdictional power has the right in
the first place to determine the extent of its jurisdiction. This
clearly applies in the absence of a clause contraireand it is particularly applicable to a pre-established international institution.''
India's conception of the problem was seen in logical terms which
were intended to maximize her sovereign prerogatives at the expense of any recognized international obligation under the Convention or Transit agreement: "Her chain of reasoning appeared
to be: (1) All questions of termination or suspension lie dehors the
treaty; (2) The jurisdiction of the ICAO Council lies within the
treaty; therefore (3) The Council of the ICAO has no jurisdiction
to handle the disagreement."'36 The difficulty, however, lay with
India's initial premise, containing what Judge Dillard termed "the
hidden assumption that all questions of termination or suspension
lie 'dehors' the treaty irrespective of any terms of the treaty. Because this assumption is questionable, India's premise was too
sweeping and, in the context of the present case, it therefore
134. [1972] I.C.J. at 102.
135.

Id. at 101.

136. Id. at 104. Judge Dillard characterized India's main contention as follows:
In denying that the Council had jurisdiction India's principal contention
(presented with great thoroughness, force and ingenuity) was that any disagreement relating to the termination or suspension of a treaty lies

completely dehors the treaty. (Dehors-the-treaty theory.) Inasmuch as it
lies dehors the treaty it cannot relate to any disagreement over the interpretation or application of the treaty. Supplementing the dehors-the-treaty
theory was a logically distinct yet related theory viz., the "non-existing"
treaty theory. This was revealed in the repeated assertion that "to interpret
or apply" presupposes the continued existence of something to interpret or
apply-an assertion which reverberated throughout the Memorial, Reply
and oral argument.
Id. at 103.
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begged the central question.""'
India had suspended unilaterally the application of the Convention and Transit agreement which contained the relevant provisions guaranteeing dispute settlement in such cases by ICAO
Council adjudication. Furthermore, India invoked a second assumption in addition to the "dehors/within the treaty" concept
intended to block the Council's jurisdiction: "[tihat 'inherent
limitations' on the Council's jurisdiction inhibit it from considering questions of 'substantive' international law under which the
suspension was effected." ' 8 Only a court of competent jurisdiction
could handle such matters, and India challenged the Council's
competence. In short, India attempted to knit together a logical
jurisdictional argument utilizing the particular facts of the case
and distinguishing the treaty's "operation" from its "application"
to "an existing state of affairs.""'' The argument was selfdefeating, however, since it was precisely that disagreement over
the interpretation and application of the Convention and Transit
agreement which justified the Council's jurisdiction ab initio.111

What defeated the logic of India's claims, however, was the failure
of her first premises. Judge Dillard stated:
When India ratified the Convention, she freely consented to the
right of all other parties to invoke Chapter XVIII of the Convention.
She cannot unilaterally derogate from that right without demonstrating that her consent was void ab initio or that the disagreement
was of such a character as to fall entirely outside the category of
disagreements embraced in Article 84. She did not address herself
to the former and her attempt to justify the latter was, of course,
disputed by Pakistan.''
In reaching this result, Judge Dillard drew on logic,4 2 contemporary municipal practices relating to contract interpreation," as
well as current states' practices by which the international community validly created an organ with adjudicative powers and responsibilities. Again, by stressing that "[t]his power was exercised with the consent of all contracting States,""' his opinion
137. Id. at 104.
138.

Id.

139. Id. at 106.
140. Id. at 109.

141. Id. at 114.
142. Id. at 95.
143. Id. at 107.
144. Id, at 105.
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served to legitimize the outcome within a functioning system or
regime for third-party judgment. As a matter of emphasis, however, the outcome turned on logical questions, partly because India
phrased the questions in that manner, but also because the interpretation was relatively settled and noncontroversial.
That the ICAO case did not involve the need for an "intersection" between positive and "object and purpose"' law was clear
from one of Judge Dillard's footnotes:
The "jurisprudential" point might be mentioned ... that multilateral treaties establishing functioning institutions frequently contain articles that represent ideals and aspirations which, being hortatory, are not considered to be binding except by those who seek
to apply them to the other fellow. On the other hand there are other
articles which are generally recognized as imposing definite legal
obligations. The point at which the former merge into the latter
constitutes one of the most delicate and difficult problems of law
and especially so in the international arena where generally accepted objective criteria for determining the meaning of language in
light of aroused expectations are more difficult to ascertain and
apply than in domestic jurisdictions. Nevertheless the problem of
determining, within the context of a specific controversy, which
articles are and which are not, legally binding cannot be altogether
avoided without indulging in the twin assumptions that law is a
"brooding omnipresence in the sky" (an extreme natural law tenet)
or that the language of law is at once self revealing and self contained, a proposition which all modern scholars concerned with linguistic analysis and communication theory reject. Happily, considerations of this kind are not required in the present controversy since
it is unnecessary to invoke the vaguer norms of the Convention and
Transit agreement in order to demonstrate that the jurisdiction of
the ICAO Council is keyed to very specific provisions involving legal
obligations of one kind
or another, which it may be the duty of the
14 5
Council to consider.
Unlike the Namibia and Nuclear Tests cases,"' the need for
"object and purpose" analysis here was virtually nonexistent. The
Court was not concerned with political questions in which the
Court's action or inaction would give impetus to an emerging international norm or prevent such norm from evolving. Here the facts
and customs were clear and the case was not "hard." Thus, Judge
Dillard's result was neither teleological nor positive, but rather was
"reasoned."
145. Id. at 107-08 n.1.
146. See Part VI A supra; Part VI C infra.
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Nuclear Tests Cases

In the Nuclear Tests Cases, Australia and New Zealand challenged the legality of French atmospheric tests in the South Pacific. The Court initially sought to have the proceedings
"addressed to the questions of the jurisdiction of the Court to
entertain the dispute, and of the admissibility of the
Application[s].

''

ll France, however, refused to participate in any

of the proceedings before the Court and continued to conduct the
tests, indicating by official communique that it would 'be in a
position to pass on to the stage of underground explosions as soon
as the series of tests planned for this summer is completed."""8 In
short, the French government indicated rather bluntly that it
would end the atmospheric tests as requested-but according to its
own testing schedule. The Court considered the French position as
voiding the presence of any controversy and concluded that "the
dispute having disappeared, the claim advanced by Australia no
longer has any object. It follows that any further finding would
have no raison d'tre."'
The Court in the Nuclear Tests Cases used a procedural technicality to escape having to make an adjudication, the outcome sanctioned by what Dugard calls a "positivist" majority.'50 Judges Onyeama, Dillard, Arechaga and Waldock wrote a joint dissenting
opinion. Although particular portions of that dissent can not be
attributed exclusively to any of the four judges, Judge Dillard has
commented on his own reasons for dissenting:
I simply could not take what the majority had done. The majority
had said that the case had become moot because of certain statements of the President of France and the Secretary of Defense of
France .... Although France walked out of the Court, she was,

in effect, challenging the jurisdiction of the Court, and Australia
and New Zealand wanted to establish our jurisdiction so that they
could get on to the merits. Also, they wanted to establish that the
issue was justiciable .... We dissenters said that what Australia

and New Zealand were after was a kind of declaratory judgment.
147. New Zealand v. France, Request for the Indication of Interim Measures
of Protection, [19731 I.C.J. 135, 142; Australia v. France, Request for the Indication of Interim Measures of Protection, [1973] I.C.J. 99, 106.
148. New Zealand v. France, Judgment, [1974] I.C.J. 457, 469; Australia v.
France, Judgment, [1974] I.C.J. 253, 265.
149. New Zealand v. France, Judgment, [1974] I.C.J. at 476; Australia v.
France, Judgment, [1974] I.C.J. at 271.
150. Dugard, supra note 74, at 496.
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Although ultimately on international law, that would be a decision
upon the merits."'1
The main objection of the judges in dissent was to the determination that the case was moot before deciding the initial jurisdictional question. Judge Dillard was further troubled by the fact that
Australia and New Zealand never had an opportunity to argue the
mootness point, and noted that
only a handful of judges had decided it had become moot. The other
judges ... thought the case was too political in the first place and
was not justiciable. They had not decided that it had become moot,
the majority
but that they wanted to terminate it. So they joined in
12
for the conclusion, but for entirely different reasons.
A distinct difference existed between declaring the question moot
and deciding ab initio that the case was too political for the Court
to hear.
In light of his own procedural observations, Judge Dillard
wanted to prevent what he thought was a hasty disposal of the
whole issue. Although the question undoubtedly had a political
aspect, the Court still had a role to play, and the nature of his
dissent was directed toward retaining the Court's jurisdiction in a
case as politically salient as the Narhibiaopinion. 53' Without reading too much into his position, it appears that he felt that the
Court was denying itself the opportunity to contribute a legal precedent in an area of law which was in a state of flux. As the joint
dissent made clear,
[T]he present case . . . concerns the continuing applicability of a
potentially evolving customary international law, elaborated at
numerous points in the Memorial and oral arguments. Whether all
or any of the contentions of the Applicant could or would not be
vindicated at the stage of the merits is irrelevant to the central issue
that they are not manifestly frivolous or vexatious but are attended
by legal consequences in which the Applicant has a legal interest.
In the language of the Northern Cameroons case, a judgment dealIssues of both
ing with them would have "continuing applicability."
15 4
fact and law remain to be clarified and resolved.
151. Interview I, supra note 29.
152. Id.; see Rubin, The InternationalLegal Effects of UnilateralDeclaration,
71 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 n.3 (1977).
153. One might distinguish the two cases on the basis that one was a contentious proceeding while the other was an advisory opinion.
154. New Zealand v. France, Judgment, [1974] I.C.J. at 504 (joint dissenting
opinion); Australia v. France, Judgment, [1974] I.C.J. at 321 (joint dissenting
opinion).
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As between the Parties, a declaratory judgment "would have given
[them] certainty as to their legal relations."'' Having isolated
and articulated the legal issues involved, Judge Dillard would have
diminished the readiness of certain members of the Court to dismiss the case, essentially for political reasons. In contrast to the
Namibia case, in the Nuclear Tests Cases, a positivist majority
was categorically abstaining from dealing with a legal problem of
"continuing applicability," and Judge Dillard would have adopted
a less one-sided view. In the Namibia case, the Court expressed a
greater "liberality in developing its general construction of the
Charter and the Covenant. It similarly gave a broad interpretation
to the Security Council's resolutions, providing them with farreaching effects." ' Emphasizing that the Namibiansolution was
of unique applicability, 57 Judge Dillard wanted to limit these farreaching effects. In the Nuclear Tests Cases his goal was exactly
the reverse.
1 58
D. FisheriesJurisdiction Case

The dispute between the United Kingdom and Iceland concentrated on Iceland's unilateral extension of its exclusive fishing
rights and the exclusion of the United Kingdom from "areas between the fishery limits agreed to in the Exchange of Notes of 11
March 1961 and the limits specified in the Icelandic Regulations
of 14 July 1972."' l The United Kingdom's first submission to the
Court was that Iceland's unilateral actions were contrary to international law ipso jure and erga omnes. A second, more cautious
approach by the United Kingdom 'suggested that Iceland had
breached the Exchange of Notes of 1961 which the Court had previously pronounced to be an effective treaty."' In a ten-to-four
decision, the Court found that the government of Iceland could not
make such a unilateral extension so as to ignore the Exchange of
Notes of 11 March 1961, and required that the two governments
be "under mutual obligations to undertake negotiations in good
155. New Zealand v. France, Judgment, [1974] I.C.J. at 503 (joint dissenting
opinion); Australia v. France, Judgment, [1974] I.C.J. at 320 (joint dissenting

opinion).
156. Brown, The 1971 L C.J. Advisory Opinion on South West Africa
(Namibia), 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213, 240 (1971).
157. [19711 I.C.J. 163 (opinion of Judge Dillard).

158. Judgment, [1974] I.C.J. 3.
159. Id. at 34.
160. Id. at 54.

Fall 1978]

JUDGE HARDY-CROSS DILLARD

645

faith for the equitable solution of their differences concerning their
respective fishery rights . .

....
"

The Court essentially rejected

Iceland's contention that its unilateral extension could be justified
by the, doctrine of fundamental change in circumstances. 62
In his separate opinion, Judge Dillard began by recognizing the
presence of both a general problem and a particularcontext." 3 He
was aware that at the time the case was presented, the Third
Conference on the Law of the Sea would shortly be considering the
same general controversies. This fact, he suggests, was one of the
"unarticulated" reasons for the Court's reluctance to pronounce on
the United Kingdom's first submission, since some judges undoubtedly feared that "it would be imprudent for the Court to
attempt to pronounce on the issue of a 'fixed' limit for the extension of fisheries jurisdiction when the issue was in a state of such
acknowledged political and legal flux."' 64 Furthermore, a general
suspicion existed that a positivist-type "head count" would be "so
charged with uncertainty" in presenting the state of customary
international law that any definitive pronouncement would appear
"tenuous."'6 5 The Court's dilemma, as Judge Dillard posed it, was
one of resolving the "complex jurisprudential problem of knowing
how best to reconcile the need for general norms in the interest of
some degree of predictability versus the need to avoid them in the
interest of the particularistic and individualistic nature of the
161.
162.
Rebus
163.
164.

Id. at 34.
See Tiewul, The Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases (1973) and the Ghost of
Sic Stantibus, 6 N.Y.U. J. IN'L L. & POL. 455 (1973).
United Kingdom v. Iceland, [1974] I.C.J. at 53.
Id. at 56. Judge Dillard also advanced two other reasons:

First, there was the notion that the state of customary international law
in 1972 with respect to unilateral extensions of fishery jurisdiction was so
charged with uncertainty, viewed simply as a kind of "head count" analysis
of State practice, as to make tenuous any definitive pronouncement on this
issue.
Second, there was the deeper notion, keyed to the evolutionary character

of customary international law which would deny that it can or should be
captured in the classical formula of repetitive usage coupled with opinio

juris, instead of recognizing that it is the product of a continuing process of
claim and counter-claim in the context of specific disputes. This concept
would render intellectually suspect any definitive pronouncement on the
"12-mile rule" erga omnes, which, because of its too generalized nature,
tended to ignore the many variables that give content to customary international law and condition its application.

Id.
165.

Id.
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subject-matter to which the norms are applicable."6' The problem required the Court to pass on an essentially equitable consideration, the outcome of which would affect the distributive allocation of scarce fishing resources. Judge Dillard, remarking that the
whole problem more closely resembled distributive rather than
corrective justice, "7 stated that "[t]he problem may well call for
the application of flexible standards instead of fixed rules."'1 8
The Court, in this instance, avoided the request by the United
Kingdom to adopt a broad, "quasi-universalist" theory of customary international law."' In requiring continued good faith negotiations between the parties, the Court refrained from imposing an
artificial uniformity upon a difficult, fact-specific controversy. 0In
the absence of any shared international norm or standard, principles of equality and equity, generally applied, do not yield sufficiently precise or particular criteria for unambiguous distributions
of scarce resources."' The presence of distributive justice concerns
alone did not mean that the Court could not become involved in
helping resolve the conflict as to the scarce resources:
[C]onsiderations of a practical, political and psychological nature
dictate that this function is best done at the outset by the parties
themselves or better still by other bodies specially qualified to assess
the conflicting interests, the relevant scientific factors, the values
involved, and the continuing need for revising the regime in light of
changing conditions. The Court's role is best limited to providing
legal guide-lines which may facilitatethe establishment of the system and in the event of a subsequent dispute, to help redress disturbances to it.72

The Court carved out a limited role for itself, not because the
issues were political or involved allocation of exhaustible resources,
166. Id. at 61.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 70, 71 n.1.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 60 n.l.
Id. at 61. Judge Dillard refers to C. DE VISSCHER's

THEORY AND

REALrry

INPUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 154 n.38 (Corbett trans. 1957) which cites the follow-

ing passage from Brierly's 1936 Hague Lectures:

Uniformity is good only when it is convenient, that is to say when it
simplifies the task in hand; it is bad when it results from an artificial

assimilation of dissimilar cases .... The nature of international society
does not merely make it difficult to develop rules of international law of

general application, it sometimes makes them undesirable.
Brierly, Regles Generalesdu Droitde la Paix,58 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, A-18 (1936).
171. Book Review, supra note 36, at 182.
172.

[1974] I.C.J. at 71.
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but because the standards were unclear, evolving, and complicated. One could only imagine the handicap under which future
law of the sea conferences would have labored had the Court attempted to generate a comprehensive regime for fishery resources.
For Judge Dillard, the solution was a matter of resolving the
"particular" so as not to handicap the future crystallization of the
"general."
Western Sahara"'
The Western Sahara case required consideration of historical
factors relating to the decolonization practice which traced their
origins back to the ninth century, yet the outcome of the controversy more precisely involved what Judge Dillard sees as one of the
main problems of the future, the legal effect of United Nations
General Assembly resolutions. Although not legislation, these decE.

larations do have "a law-making aspect to them

.

.

with over-

whelming majorities. Does this not have a generating effect in
creating law?"' 7 Insofar as the status of the Western Sahara and
its nomadic tribes were concerned, the United Nations had made
repeated resolutions calling for decolonization by Spain and selfdetermination in this area, and Judge Dillard "thought that that
had a legitimate role to play in determining whether or not the
Western Sahara shouldn't have a voice."' '
The Court's advisory opinion sought to answer two legal questions: first, whether the Western Sahara at the time it was colonized by Spain belonged to no one (terra nullius), and second, if
the Western Sahara was not terra nullius, whether legal ties
existed between this territory, the Kingdom of Morocco, and the
Mauritanian entity? 7 The Court unanimously declared that the
Western Sahara was not terra nullius at the time of its colonization, and that there were
legal ties of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and some of
the tribes living in the territory of Western Sahara. [The materials
reviewed by the Court] equally show the existence of rights, including some rights relating to the land, which constituted legal ties
between the Mauritanian entity ...

Sahara.'77

173. [1975] I.C.J. 12.
174. Interview I, supra note 29.
175. Id.

176.

[19751 I.C.J. at 14.

177. Id. at 68.

and the territory of Western
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The questions confronting the Court, however, were not exclusively
of a legal nature and susceptible to a concrete answer "based on
law."'' Any answer provided by the Court in its advisory opinion
would be primarily of historical and political significance, but the
presence of numerous General Assembly resolutions concerning
decolonization had the effect of creating a legal context for the
Court's consideration of the problem. On this point, Judge Dillard
felt that "the cumulative impact of many resolutions when similar
in content, voted for by overwhelming majorities and frequently
repeated over a period of time may give rise to a general opinio
juris and thus constitute a norm of customary international
law."' 7 The Court, then, through its own pronouncements was
helping to establish such a norm in its explicit recognition of the
General Assembly's law-creating powers.
Judge Dillard's separate opinion primarily examined the nature
of the legal ties between the Sultan and the chiefs of the nomadic
tribes wandering throughout the Western Sahara. The presence or
absence of such ties was a critical factor in the ability of the Court
to determine the present status of the nomads. The concept of a
legal tie in terms of traditional western standards implying notions
of sovereignty, obligation, and the view of laws as orders backed
by officially enforceable threats, howevei, was inapplicable to the
relationship between the tribes and the Sultan and Ma ul-'Aineen
or the Emir of the Adras. In resolving the nature of the legal ties
in the Western Sahara, Judge Dillard emphasized the need for a
"broader approach" unlike that commonly accepted in "postReformation western oriented societies":
Concepts of this kind are not applicable to a society, such as
prevailed in the Sahara, in which a distinction between modes of
authority are not sharply delineated and are not part of the consciousness of people. It is artificial, therefore, to say that a tie is not
"legal" merely because it fails to qualify as one in which a sense of
obligation is owed vertically to the secular power of someone with
authority. The manifestation of power is neither secular nor religious since the distinction, itself, has little meaning.
The important thing is that the tribes criss-crossing in the Western Sahara felt themselves to be a part of a larger whole, while also
claiming rights in the territory focused on the intermittent possession of water-holes, burial grounds and grazing pastures. All this
should suffice to characterize ties as being legal once we rid our178. Id. at 117.
179. Id. at 121.
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selves of the preconceptions which identify "legal" with deference
to mere secular authority.18
In conclusion, Judge Dillard remarked that the outcome depended
upon actual consultation with the members of the tribes themselves: "The bigger reality lies in the possible sense of unity and
belonging which the people themselves feel with respect to their
own or neighbouring territories. This can only be adequately determined by consulting them one way or another." ''
The significance of Judge DiUllard's views in this advisory opinion
lies in his conception of the proper sources of international law. If
Hart is correct in maintaining that the form of international law
resembles a regime or system of primary rules, then it is clear that
the rules involved in this opinion are extremely primitive. Whether
the matter of decolonization itself could be considered a legal question depended upon the acceptance of General Assembly resolutions as having legal consequences and the Court's willingness to
consider them as having law-creating consequences. Actual resolution of concrete problems in light of this norm required, however,
a more positivistic inquiry into the habits, customs, and claims of
tribal societies. Not only did the Court's advisory opinion sanction
norm creation by the General Assembly's basically political action,
thereby recognizing the problem as one having legal significance,
but the Court also legitimized the status of the tribes themselves
as critical actors in the eventual tailoring of the more general norm
to their particularcircumstances.

VII. FINAL OBSERVATIONS

AND CONCLUSION

On February 9, 1979, a new judge assumed the vacancy on the
Court created by the expiration of Judge Dillard's term. During the
180. Id. at 125-26.
181. Id. at 126. In his Hague Lectures, Judge Dillard also recognized that
aspects of "historical relativism" had a role to play in the analysis of particular
disputes:
Under this view international law is equated with "primitive" law, and
hence what is needed is patience, the long view and the realization that, as
primitive societies gradually evolved to maturity so will the modem state
system. "Time" will come to the rescue of law. This view emphasizes the
fact that the modem state, based on the concept of a single sovereign
commanding the fused loyalty of people inhabiting a determinate piece of
territory is, after all, only a few hundred years old. Made possible by the
gradual erosion of feudalism and born of the turbulent Reformation it is
only natural that it should suffer the growing pains so normal to youth.
Dillard, supra note 33, at 467.
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past nine years, the Court has not been particularly active, but
virtually all of Judge Dillard's official writings as a member of the
Court have either looked toward insulating the Court's decisionmaking authority from political criticism when a norm has been
too broadly enunciated, or toward prodding the Court to take a
more norm-creating posture. Although he acknowledged that some
reason exists for concern regarding the Court's modest docket, he
adds that much of the criticism concerning the docket comes from
improper comparisons with the old Permanent Court of International Justice, in which a heavier docket included most of the
contentious cases related to World War I peace treaties and related
disputes. With regard to an individual State's reluctance to come
before the Court, he noted:
I have sympathy for the nation State that is a little reluctant to trust
a court of fifteen judges, . . . not because some of them are foreigners ...but because they do not cumulatively have enough wisdom,

perhaps, to understand the dimensions of the problem that is worrying the nation State .... It's a question of the human equation.'

Over twenty years ago, then Professor Dillard characterized the
reluctance-"overreluctance" as he then termed it-of nations to
agree in advance to submission of disputes to the Court as depending upon the ability to understand "the limits of the judicial process in the context of a society which provides no constitutional
devices adequate to supplement the work of the Court and to provide measures for controlling-at a remote stage-the incidences
of its judgments."' 1
This judicial process, dealing as it must with unsettled issues
and complicated facts in the international arena, must develop a
statesman-like approach to dispute settlement in general, and
must utilize the ordering, rule-creating process of international law
in particular. The problem is one similar to that faced by Chief
Justice John Marshall, whose Court not only had to settle concrete
cases, but had to do so in a fashion which gradually solidified its
own institutional legitimacy.1 The International Court of Justice
faces a more complicated institutional problem, since its own jurisdiction in any case depends upon the individual nations' consent.
The opinions surveyed in this article demonstrate the wide latitude
the Court has in the area of articulating its own concept of norma182. Interview 1U, supra note 38.
183. Dillard, supra note 33, at 496.
184. See generally G. WHrrE, THE AMFcAN

LEGAL TRADITMON

7-34 (1976).
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tive international law. At the same time, however, opinions such
as those dealing with Namibia and the French nuclear tests illustrate the varyingdegree to which members of the Court are willing
to articulate broad norms, or, instead, render decisions on relatively narrow, noncontroversial grounds. Although law clearly
helps to shape the values and produce the sense of cohesion necessary for effective social organization, in the international context,
this process is more difficult to sustain. In his Hague Lectures,
Judge Dillard characterized the international community as one
which made this rule-enunciating or "ordering" process particularly complicated: "The international system is hardly a society,
much less a community, and, in any event, within the confines of
the society the sense of cohesion is so weak and the sharing of
common values so limited, that law cannot be expected to operate
effectively."'' 5 For precisely these reasons, Judge Dillard would
have the Court stay out of areas of distributive justice. 8 Although
in his Hague Lectures he noted that "[t]he power of the Court
'increases in direct proportion as the norms increase in generality," 7 his tenure on the Court has shown that norms stated too
broadly can, by virtue of the lack of any international consensus,
serve to undermine states' respect for the Court as a judicial institution. As the survey of his opinions demonstrates, his role has
been to push for broad normative statements when the facts of a
case so allow and to restrict those norms in situations where a
Court-articulated general standard might reduce the flexibility of
future parties in fashioning a more consensus-based norm in light
of their own particular experiences.
Judge Dillard misses the "roving room" of the classroom, 88 and
the business of being a judge has necessarily curbed his ability to
do as much reading as he would prefer. Nonetheless, serving on the
Court has provided him with an opportunity as a professor-turnedjudge to apply his jurisprudential theories to concrete cases of
importance to people throughout the world. As this article has
shown, Hardy Dillard's jurisprudential habits of mind have stayed
with him throughout his career, shaping his understanding of the
facts and thereby infusing his decisions with the "intersection concept"-the hybrid jurisprudence blending positivism with "object
and purpose" analysis. The International Court of Justice shares
185.
186.
187.
188.

Dillard, supra note 33, at 469.
Interview II, supra note 38.
Dillard, supra note 33, at 485.
Interview I, supra note 29.
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many similarities with the nascent United States Supreme Court,
the most visible being its caution in treating cases so as to preserve
and, if possible, to further its own jurisdictional legitimacy in the
international community. To this end, Judge Dillard would urge
an expansion of the Court's current jurisdiction in order to permit
it to hear questions presented by multinational corporations and
international organizations. He further wishes the Court to exercise a greater "monitoring" practice, going beyond simply settling
disputes after they have arisen. Finally, he favors the use of declaratory judgments by the Court where it can exercise leadership in
determining the direction and content of the norms of international law. 89 In short, Judge Dillard has, both as professor and
judge, remained faithful to the approach to law espoused by Roscoe Pound-"a functional critique of international law in terms of
[its] social ends."0 At the same time, his professional career
embodies those attributes which Pound felt were necessary for the
future development of international legal standards: the mastery
of existing legal materials, philosophical vision, and juristic
faith."'
189.
190.
191.

Interview I, supra note 29.
Pound, supra note 175, at 89.
Id. at 90.

